5. Al Qaeda functioned both on its own and through some of the
terrorist organizations that operated under its umbrella, including:
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and at times, the Islamic Group (also
known as “el Gamaa Islamia” or simply “Gamaa’t”), led by Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman and later by Ahmed Refai Taha, a / k/a “Abu
Yasser al Masri,” named as co-conspirators but not as defendants
herein; and a number of jihad groups in other countries, including
the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea,
Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria,
Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan
and the Kashmiri region of India and the Chechnyan region of
Russia. Al Qaeda also maintained cells and personnel in a number
of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya,
Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States.
6. Al Qaeda had a command and control structure which included
a majlis al shura (or consultation council) which discussed and
approved major undertakings, including terrorist operations.
The defendants USAMA BIN LADEN, MUHAMMAD ATEF,
a/ k/a “Abu Hafs,” AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI, SAIF AL ADEL,
MAMDOUH MAHMUD SALIM, a / k/a “Abu Hajer,” and
ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH, a / k/a “Abu Mohamed el
Masry,” a / k/a “Saleh,” among others, sat on the majlis al shura
(or consultation council) of al Qaeda. Egyptian Islamic Jihad
had a Founding Council, on which the defendant IBRAHIM
EIDAROUS sat.
APPENDIX 125
7. Al Qaeda also had a “military committee” which considered
and approved “military ” matters. MUHAMMAD ATEF, a / k/a
“Abu Hafs,” the defendant, sat on the military committee and
was one of defendant USAMA BIN LADEN’s two principal
military commanders together with “Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri,”
until the death of “Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri” in May 1996.
Among his other duties, MUHAMMAD ATEF, a / k/a “Abu
Hafs,” the defendant, had the principal responsibility for supervising
the training of al Qaeda members. SAIF AL ADEL
also served on the military committee, reporting to MUHAMMAD
ATEF, a / k/a “Abu Hafs.”
8. USAMA BIN LADEN, the defendant, and al Qaeda also forged
alliances with the National Islamic Front in the Sudan and with
representatives of the government of Iran, and its associated
terrorist group Hizballah, for the purpose of working together
against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly
the United States.
9. In or about 1994, the defendant USAMA BIN LADEN, working
together with KHALID AL FAWWAZ, a / k/a “ Khaled Abdul
Rahman Hamad al Fawwaz,” a / k/a “Abu Omar,” a/ k/a “Hamad,”
set up a media information offi ce in London, England (hereafter
the “London offi ce”), which was designed both to publicize
the statements of USAMA BIN LADEN and to provide a
cover for activity in support of al Qaeda’s “military” activities,
including the recruitment of military trainees, the disbursement
of funds and the procurement of necessary equipment (including
satellite telephones) and necessary services. In addition,
the London offi ce served as a conduit for messages, including
reports on military and security matters from various al Qaeda
cells, including the Kenyan cell, to al Qaeda’s headquarters.
COUNTS ONE THROUGH SIX:
CONSPIRACIES TO MURDER, BOMB AND MAIM
COUNT ONE:
CONSPIRACY TO KILL UNITED STATES NATIONALS
10. From at least 1991 until the date of the fi ling of this Indictment,
in the Southern District of New York, in Afghanistan,
the United Kingdom, Pakistan, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia,
126 APPENDIX
Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, the Philippines
and elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular state or
district, USAMA BIN LADEN, . . . [ list of other defendants],
defendants, at least one of whom was fi rst brought to and arrested
in the Southern District of New York, together with
other members and associates of al Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic
Jihad and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully,
wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated
and agreed to kill nationals of the United States.
Document 5
On October 3, 2001, the Committee on International Relations of the U.S.
House of Representatives met to consider the threat posed by al-Qaeda. Following
is a prepared statement presented to the committee. The statements
provide an indication of what the U.S. intelligence committee knew at the
time of the 9/11 attacks. Their picture of bin Laden and his organization
was incomplete and inaccurate. This statement and the transcript of the
entire meeting may be found at http://www.internationalrelations.house.
gov/archives/107/75562.pdf.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF VINCENT
CANNISTRARO, FORMER CHIEF OF
COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I am pleased to appear before this committee to provide my views on
al-Qaeda, its structure and its objectives. It is important to note that
Americans have a diffi cult time in understanding extremist organizations
with a religious orientation like al-Qaeda. It is essential that the
agencies of our government involved in law enforcement and intelligence
become intimately familiar with the culture of religious zealots
whether of foreign or domestic origin. We must understand the nature
of the threat before we can successfully confront it. In America, we
also have fundamentalists such as Christian Identity, and other religious
extremists who kill or maim in the name of God. Comprehending the
APPENDIX 127
danger and the mind-set of these groups is a fi rst step to deterring the violence
executed by the Osama Bin Laden’s of the world. Unless we know
what drives these religious extremists, who are willing to kill themselves
in the performance of their violent acts, we will see days like September
11, 2001, repeated, perhaps with even greater casualties. It is worth
studying the evolution of the al-Qaeda group. Bin Laden, who opposes
the American infl uence in the Middle East, was outraged by the 1990
Persian Gulf War which saw American and other western troops stationed
in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden considers the country, ruled by the
Al-Sau’d family, as the guardian of the Islamic holy places. King Abd’al
aziz al-Sau’d, who founded the monarchy, had the support of the Wahabis,
the fundamentalist Islamic sect. The al-Sau’d monarchy derives
its authority from the Wahabis, who allied with Abd’al aziz, in creating
modern Saudi Arabia. In return, the monarchy serves to guarantee the
sanctity of Mecca and Medina, the site and magnetic pole for pilgrimages
by the world’s Muslims. In Bin Laden’s view, the Saudi monarchy
betrayed that sacred pact by allowing Christian and Jewish soldiers to be
stationed on the soil of this Islamic country which had been entrusted
with a special protectorate mission for the holy places. Bin Laden’s opposition
to the monarch resulted in his expulsion from the Kingdom.
Shortly after, Bin Laden used his personal fortune and continuing contributions
from wealthy Islamic businessmen in Saudi and the Gulf to organize
training camps in the Sudan for Islamic activists from every major
Islamic country. These contributions, plus revenues from Islamic Charity
fronts, such as the International Islamic Relief Organization, headed by
Bin Laden’s brother-in-law, as well as numerous other charitable fronts,
continue to fuel his group today .
The international cadres that comprise many of the networks associated
with al-Qaeda were trained by so-called “Arab-Afghans” with
fi ghting experience from the Soviet-Afghan war, although many of these
“mujahedin” did not reach Afghanistan until after the Soviet withdrawal
in 1989. The main mission for Bin Laden was to disperse trained fi ghters
to their native lands to fi ght against the secular Arab regimes and
replace them with religious governments based on the Sharia-Islamic
rather than civil law. The targets were secular Muslim countries such as
Egypt and Algeria, and Muslim-dominated provinces such as Chechnya
128 APPENDIX
and Dagestan in Russia and in Bosnia and Kosovo. Anti-government
movements were also promoted in Libya and Tunisia as well. Indeed,
Bin Laden’s vision is to re-establish the “Islamic Caliphate” across every
Muslim country, a religious restoration of the old Ottoman Empire, this
time under the leadership of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. Usama
sees the United States and its world infl uence as the principal obstacle
to achieving his vision.
Bin Laden relocated his operations to Afghanistan following pressure
on the Sudan exerted by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. The Taliban,
a group of religious students from Pakistani schools, were successful in
establishing control over Afghanistan with the active military support
of Pakistan’s military intelligence service, the Inter Services Directorate
(ISI). Pakistan’s concern was to promote ethnic Pashtun control
over the country, which was being run by Afghans hostile to Pashtun
rule and Pakistani infl uence. The Pashtuns, or Pathans in common western
usage, designates several dozen separate tribes on both sides of the
Afghan/ Pakistani border. The Taliban, lacking a secular education, is
almost medieval in its concept of governance. The Taliban rulers have
mismanaged the country, but have been amenable to Pakistani political
infl uence although not totally subservient to it. Pakistan has also used
its position and support to the Taliban to establish within Afghanistan a
series of training camps for Kashmiri terrorists. ISI personnel are present,
in mufti, to conduct the training. This arrangement allowed Pakistan
“plausible denial” that it is promoting insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan
also provisioned the Taliban with weapons to fi ght the “ Northern Alliance”
which contests Taliban control over the country and had until
recently about 7% of Afghan territory, mostly north of Kabul and in the
Panshir. The Northern Alliance, while including some Pashtuns, has
been commanded by Ahmad Shah Massud, an ethnic Tajik. About three
weeks ago, Massud was assassinated by suicide bombers identifi ed as part
of Bin Laden’s group.
The bonds between Mullah Omar, and Usama Bin Laden, are bonds
of blood and Bin Laden has offered “ bayat” to Mullah Omar, an offering
of submission to his will and his leadership. Bin Laden recently
declared Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as the “new Mecca” and Mullah
Omar as the new caliph. It is therefore all but impossible for Mullah
Omar to turn over Bin Laden to the U.S. for prosecution as the U.S.
APPENDIX 129
has demanded. The Taliban and Bin Laden’s estimated 4,000 to 5,000
fi ghters are intertwined with the Taliban military and Mullah Omar
considers Bin Laden as his right hand.
What is Al-Qaeda? The Arabic word means the “Base,” or “foundation.”
Bin Laden does not refer to his international network as al-Qaeda.
This word refers to his companion in arms at his headquarters in Southern
Afghanistan. In his camps perhaps 10,000 Bangladeshi, Pakistani,
Tunisian, Moroccan, Algerian, Egyptian and ethnic Chechens, Dagestanis,
Kosovars and dozens of other nationalities have been trained.
Some of them are provided specialized intelligence training, some
schooled in the arts of making improvised explosive devices, and others
given instruction in the production and use of chemical weapons. Those
not chosen for specialized tasks are given combat training and either sent
back to their native countries to foment insurgency against their secular
regimes or enlisted in his combat brigade that fi ghts alongside the Taliban
against the Northern opposition. For the past four years, Bin Laden’s
men have fought with the Taliban against Massud, and have suffered
the losses of at least seven hundred to a thousand men in the fi ghting,
including one of Bin Laden’s own sons about seven months ago.
It is important to distinguish between the so-called “loose networks”
of affi liated groups, and the tightly controlled inner circle of al-Qaeda
that conceives and implements their strategic operations. The bombing
of the USS Cole, for example, was a tightly controlled al-Qaeda operation
that had some local support, drawn from the Islamic Army of Aden,
a radical Islamic group in the Yemen set up by Bin Laden’s brother-inlaw
and funded by Usama. The operation was apparently directed by
Muhammad Atef, an Egyptian who serves as Bin Laden’s Chief of Operations.
It was Atef’s daughter who married one of Bin Laden’s sons
last May, a marriage that also symbolized the merger of the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad into al-Qaeda, and a new name for the inner circle: “Jidad
al-Qaeda.”
The Ahmad Ressam case, was an example of the use of affi liated groups
by al-Qaeda to promote violence against America. This was the “millennium”
plot frustrated when Ressam panicked at the Canadian / US border
while transporting materials for fi ve bombs. Ressam, a member of an Algerian
terrorist faction funded and supported by Bin Laden, was trained
at an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan and given $12,000 seed money. He
130 APPENDIX
was told to raise the rest of the monies needed through criminal activity
in Canada, organize his cell, and choose targets in America to destroy.
Ressam planned to plant bombs at Los Angeles International Airport, to
kill as many people as possible. At the same time, a more centrally controlled
and sensitive al-Qaeda operation was being implemented in the
port of Aden, against the USS The Sullivans, the sister ship of the Cole.
The explosives laden boat sank in the harbor while being piloted by the
two would-be suicide bombers. They swam back to shore, and went to
ground, certain that their abortive operation would be discovered. It was
not. About 8 months later, the same operation, using more sophisticated
and lighter explosives, was carried out against the Cole. The devastating
results are well known.
How does the al-Qaeda organization fund its worldwide network of
cells and affi liated groups? Several businessmen in Saudi Arabia and in
the Gulf contribute monies. Many of these contributions are given out
of a sense of Islamic solidarity. But much of the money is paid as “protection”
to avoid having the enterprises run by these men attacked. There is
little doubt that a fi nancial conduit to Bin Laden was handled through
the National Commercial Bank, until the Saudi government fi nally arrested
a number of persons and closed down the channel. It was evident
that several wealthy Saudis were funneling contributions to Bin Laden
through this mechanism. Now, it appears, that these wealthy individuals
are siphoning off funds from their worldwide enterprises in creative and
imaginative ways. For example, orders may be given to liquidate a stock
portfolio in New York, and have those funds deposited in a Gulf, African
or Hong Kong bank controlled by a Bin Laden associate. Other channels
exist for the fl ow of monies to Bin Laden, through fi nancial entities in
the UAE and Qatar. Cash, carried to intermediaries, is also a source of
funding. There are some female members of Bin Laden’s own family who
have been sending cash from Saudi Arabia to his “front” accounts in the
Gulf. I will stop my remarks here, and I am prepared to address any questions
you may have.
Document 6
On October 3, 2001, the Committee on International Relations of the U.S.
House of Representatives met to consider the threat posed by al-Qaeda.
APPENDIX 131
Oliver Revell attributes to bin Laden several attacks we now know he did
not carry out. These statements and the transcript of the entire meeting may
be found at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/107/75
562.pdf.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF OLIVER “BUCK”
REVELL, FORMER ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
IN CHARGE OF INVESTIGATIVE AND
COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chairman Hyde, I thank you and members of your Committee for the
opportunity to testify during these hearings. Yours is an extremely important
responsibility and I know that you and your colleagues want to
provide the very best support that you can to our President and those
in our Government, military, intelligence, diplomatic and law enforcement
that must face this challenge. I will try and provide you with my
honest and forthright assessment and opinions based upon the forty
years that I have now been involved in this arena.
The terrible events of September 11, 2001 shall ever remain in our
collective memories. I like so many other Americans lost friends in the
attacks. I wish that I could tell you that the attacks could not have been
anticipated and that we are unlikely to face such devastation again. I
cannot. For it is very clear that we have been the targets of a sustained
campaign of terrorism since 1979. The fall of the Shah of Iran and
the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic State in Iran under the
Ayatollah Khomeini, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet
Union in 1979 were the predicates of the tragedy that we suffered on
September 11th. In Iran the Islamic extremists found that they could
take and hold Americans hostage without serious repercussions. Out of
that experience the Iranian backed Hezbollah bombed our Embassies
in Beirut twice and Kuwait once, as well as killing over two hundred
Marines in a suicide truck bombing. The Hezbollah took American’s
hostage and hijacked our airliners and yet we seemed impotent to respond.
Before we even knew of Osama bin Laden, Imad Mugniyah of
the Hezbollah was the leading terrorist against America. He was directly
responsible for the attacks against our personnel and facilities in
132 APPENDIX
Lebanon and yet he and his organization have never been punished for
their crimes against our nation.
This example was not lost on the founders of al Qaida, primarily members
of the Afghan mujahidin from Arab countries. Osama bin Laden
and his associates’ experienced fi rst hand that guerilla warfare and terrorist
tactics could defeat a “Super Power.” He learned from Mugniyah
that America was not likely to fi ght back. Since the attack on the American
Special Forces on a humanitarian mission in Somalia in 1992 bin
Laden and his associates have carried out a steady and increasingly deadly
campaign against America and Americans. The following are but the
publicly known events:
1. Somalia 1992
2. World Trade Center, New York, 1993
3. Planned attacks against multiple targets in New York in July
1993
4. Planned assassination of Pope John Paul in the Philippines
1994 (Americans were in the Pope’s entourage)
5. Planned assassination of President Clinton in the Philippines
1995
6. Planned bombings of 11–13 American Airliners over Pacifi c
Ocean 1995
7. Car bombing of U.S. military mission in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
1995
8. Truck bombing of U.S. Air Force housing area Khubar Towers,
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 1996
9. Truck bombing U.S. Embassy, Kenya 1998
10. Truck bombing U.S. Embassy, Tanzania 1998
11. Plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport, Y2K, New
Year 2000
12. Plot to bomb East Coast target, Y2K, New Year, 2000
13. Plot to attack U.S. Naval Ship in Yemen, January 2000
14. Suicide boat attack on USS Cole, Yemen October 2000
By September 11th we certainly should have known that we were
the principal targets of a terrorist campaign unlike any we had ever faced.
And yet we totally failed to recognize the impending disaster that stalked
APPENDIX 133
our nation. Some of us in the Counter-terrorist business tried to warn of
the danger, but we were generally thought of as alarmists. For the purpose
of lessons learned I am citing the concerns I, among others, expressed
about our lack of preparedness for the struggle we now face as a war.
In a speech to a conference held by the National Institute of Justice
in May of 1999 on “ Terrorism & Technology: Threat and Challenge in
the 21st Century” I pointed out my concerns for our lack of readiness to
deal with the growing threat of terrorism. Some of these remarks are set
forth below.
“ The rather abrupt end to the Cold War was expected to bring about
a substantial improvement in international cooperation, and a concordant
change in the manner in which governments dealt with transnational
issues such as terrorism and organized crime. However, the expected
improvements in overall safety and security of U.S. citizens and interests
have not materialized except at the strategic level. Terrorism remains a
constant and viable threat to American interests on a global basis even
though the sources of the threat may be evolving into heretofore unknown
or undetected elements/organizations.
The threat is changing and increasing due to the following factors:
1. The philosophy, motivation, objectives and modus operandi of
terrorists groups both domestic and international has changed.
2. The new terrorist groups are not concerned with and in many
instances are trying to infl ict mass causalities.
3. Terrorist groups now have ready access to massive databases
concerning the entire United States infrastructure including
key personnel, facilities, and networks.
4. Aided by state sponsors or international organized crime groups,
terrorist can obtain weapons of mass destruction.
5. The Internet now allows even small or regional terrorist groups
to have a worldwide C3I (Command, Control, Communication
and Intelligence) system, and propaganda dissemination
capability.
6. Domestic anti-government reactionary extremists have proliferated,
and now pose a signifi cant threat to the Federal Government
and to law enforcement at all levels. Militia organizations
have targeted the Federal Government for hostile actions, and
134 APPENDIX
could target any element of our society that is deemed to be
their adversary.
7. Islamic extremism has spread to the point where it now has a
global infrastructure, including a substantial network in the
United States.
Terrorism has been a tough political, analytical and operational target
for years. Nonetheless, twenty years ago, analysts could agree on
several “tenets of terrorism.” First, terrorists were viewed as falling into
one of three categories: those that were politically motivated, and used
violence as a means to achieve legitimacy, such as the IRA or PLO, or;
those that used violence as a means of uprising, or fi nally; those that were
state-sponsored whose violence was manipulated by foreign powers to
achieve political leverage. Second, terrorists were generally thought to
calculate thresholds of pain and tolerance, so that their cause was not
irrevocably compromised by their actions.
While U.S. offi cials worried about terrorists “graduating ” to the use
of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear, we believed that most
terrorist groups thought mass casualties were counterproductive. This
was because mass casualties seemed to de-legitimize the terrorists’ cause,
would certainly generate strong governmental responses, and erode terrorist
group cohesion. In essence, we thought a certain logic and morality
line existed beyond which terrorists dared not go. The different types of
terrorist groups had a wide range of motives. The extreme left’s motivation
for violence has been signifi cantly diminished by the disenchantment
with communism on a global scale. These groups fi nd that their
message is out-of-fashion, and they can no longer mobilize the public
to their causes. This loss of motivation is a major reason for the recent
downward trend in international terrorist incidents, as documented in
the State Department’s report, “Patterns in Global Terrorism.” The threat
level of all leftist groups globally, once rated high, is now considered moderate.
Of the twenty-two known groups, three have denounced violence
altogether. Indeed, high collateral casualties are inconsistent with the
fundamental message of leftist terrorists who profess their goal to be the
betterment of the masses.
State-sponsored terror has seen a notable decline in the last several
years for three primary reasons. First, the Middle East peace process has
APPENDIX 135
given previously violent groups and states a motive to refrain from terrorism
in order to gain leverage and bargaining power at the table. Second,
post Cold-War geopolitical realities have brought about many new
agreements and growing cooperation among nations in countering terrorism.
One of the largest sponsors of terrorism in the past — the former
communist East European countries — are now aggressively supporting
counter-terrorism initiatives.
However, several state sponsors remain who continue to fund, motivate,
support, and train terrorists. Iran is by far the most active of these
state sponsors, with the greatest long-term commitment and worldwide
reach. Iraq remains of concern, but has a more limited transnational
capability. However, attacks within Iraq’s own backyard, such as the attempted
assassination of former President George Bush in 1993 during
his Kuwaiti trip, and the assassinations of dissidents in Jordan, are more
likely to threaten the peace and stability of the region. Syria is a more
pragmatic sponsor, by providing supplies in transit, but has refrained
more recently from terrorism in order to enhance its negotiating position
in the peace talks. Its loss of USSR patronage has meant a decline
in fi nancial and logistical support, but it nevertheless allows some rejectionists
to maintain headquarters in Syria. Hezbollah still receives
supplies through the Damascus airport and operates openly in parts of
Syria and Syrian controlled territory. The newest sponsor on the list is
Sudan, which was added in 1993 because of its provision of safe haven
and training for a variety of terrorist groups. Sudan has hosted Osama
Bin Laden’s facilities. Libya, a notorious state sponsor, has also refrained
lately from terrorism in order to obtain some sanctions relief. It continues,
however, to target dissidents, fund extremist Palestinians, and provide
safe haven for Abu Nidal, all while attempting to avoid accountability
for the Pan Am 103 bombing. The recent surrender of the Pan Am 103
suspects came only after crippling sanctions by the United Nations. For
state-sponsored terrorism, the value of deterrence retains credibility, and
America should not relinquish this capability.
Radical Islamic groups are now the most active in terms of the rate
of incidents. Many of these groups are considered separatists, and desire
a seat at the recognition and negotiation table. Others, considered
extreme Islamic zealots, operate as loosely affi liated groups, as in the World
Trade Center and East African bombings. For these groups deterrence has
136 APPENDIX
less effect. And in fact many have stated that they wanted to maximize
casualties to punish the United States, which they have demonized as
the Great Satan.
Ethnic separatist terrorism, as old as mankind, can be temporarily
sidetracked by a few contemporary geopolitical developments, but generally,
it is impervious to such developments because its root-cause is
invariable long-lived. Most of these groups seek world recognition and
endorsement; to date, they have not resorted to the use of weapons of
mass destruction. . . .
The argument has been made that while traditional terrorism — in
terms of motivations — is still a large segment of the terrorist population,
there is a new breed of terrorist for which the old paradigms either
do not apply at all or have limited application. These groups — cults, religious
extremists, anarchists, or serial killers — must be regarded as serious
threats, and perhaps the most serious of the terrorist groups operating
today. These “new ” terrorists are driven by a different set of motivations:
they seek an immediate reward for their act, and their motivations and
objectives may range from rage, revenge, hatred, mass murder, extortion,
or embarrassment, or any combination of these. They may desire mass
casualties, or at least not care about how many people are killed in their
attacks. As such, they do not make traditional calculations of thresholds
of pain or tolerance within a society. These groups tend to be loosely affi
liated both internationally and domestically, and may have no ties at all
to state sponsorship. They change affi liations and identities as needed,
and are extremely diffi cult to detect. Where traditional groups want publicity
to further their cause, many “new” terrorists do not desire attribution;
this is particularly true of the religious extremists, God knows,
and will reward. Religious extremism is growing in numbers, and is not
limited to the Islamic faith. While the “new” terrorist may have a variety
of motivations, some single issue groups, such as, extremists in the animal
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