decision resulted from a change of government rather than intimidation,
al-Qaeda claimed victory. Italy, too, left the coalition following the deaths
of 12 of its soldiers in Iraq.
On the eve of the 2004 presidential election, bin Laden spoke again
to the American people. He admonished them to repudiate the wicked
policies of their government and explained al-Qaeda’s long-term strategy
of attrition. “All we had to do was send two mujahedeen to the farthest
east to raise aloft a piece of rag with the words ‘al-Qaeda’ written on it, and
the [U.S.] generals came a-scurrying — causing America to suffer human,
economic, and political damages while accomplishing nothing worth
mentioning aside from providing business [contracts] for their private
corporations,” he explained.
On the other hand, we have gained experience in guerrilla and attritional
warfare in our jihad against the great and wicked superpower,
Russia, which we, along-side the mujahedeen , fought for ten years
until, bankrupt, it was forced to withdraw [out of Afghanistan in
1989] — all praise be to Allah! And so we are continuing the same
policy: to make America bleed till it becomes bankrupt.24
Following this message, bin Laden stayed off the airwaves for more
than a year. Then, in January 2006, he released an audiotape in which
he offered the American people a truce. If the United States would
withdraw its forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda would cease
its campaign of terror against it. “The war in Iraq is raging without end
[in sight]; the operations in Afghanistan are continually escalating in
our favor — praise be to Allah,” he stated, reiterating the cost of the war
in U.S. blood and treasure. “Pentagon fi gures show an increase in your
casualties and wounded — let alone the massive economic loses, the
destruction of soldiers’ morale there, and an increase [in cases] of suicide
among them.”25 Neither war was going well at the time, but it is hard to
believe that bin Laden could have been so deluded as to believe that the
White House or the public would take his offer seriously. As with most
of his pronouncements, the real audience was probably his supporters
in the Muslim world. He reminded them periodically of the justness of
al-Qaeda’s cause and of its inevitable ultimate triumph.
BIN LADEN AND AL-QAEDA, POST-9/11 105
THE AL-QAEDA THREAT
As al-Qaeda has gone deeper underground, gaining precise information
on its strength and capabilities has become increasingly diffi cult. Sources
available in the public domain allow only tentative conclusions. Twenty
years after its creation and eight years after its most dramatic success, al-
Qaeda remains a formidable threat. The central organization has rebuilt
itself in the ungoverned border lands between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In cooperation with the Taliban, it continues to wage a protracted war
to regain control of Afghanistan and threatens the stability of Pakistan.
It can still direct operations abroad, although efforts by the West appear
to have diminished its capacity to concentrate resources and talent for
dramatic strikes like the East Africa bombings and 9/11.
The election of Democratic President Barack Obama in November
2008 has led to a change in U.S. military strategy. Obama has begun reducing
the U.S. presence in Iraq and shifting troops to Afghanistan. The
United States has also put increasing pressure on the new government
in Pakistan to take more aggressive action against al-Qaeda and Taliban
members operating on its soil. In the spring of 2009, the Pakistani
army launched an offensive against Taliban forces in the Swat Valley on
its northwest frontier with Afghanistan. In early July, 4,000 U.S. Marines,
in cooperation with Afghan forces, launched an offensive to regain control
of Helmund Province, while Pakistani troops blocked escape routes
on their side of the border. The offensive was part of Washington’s new
“clear and hold” strategy, made possible by increasing U.S. troop strength
by more than 20,000. In the fall the Pakistanis moved against the Taliban
stronghold in South Waziristan.
Gauging the strength of al-Qaeda’s global network of cells and affi liates
is even more diffi cult than assessing the capabilities of the central
organization. A steady, highly effective, and largely unnoticed campaign
supported by U.S. Special Forces has crippled its ability to operate in the
Philippines. Islamist extremism in Indonesia also appears to have waned
since the days of the Bali bombing. In other areas of the world, however,
the al-Qaeda network may have grown stronger. Filled with secondgeneration
young men resentful of their low status and lack of opportunity,
the Muslim communities in Western Europe remain a cause of
106 OSAMA BIN LADEN
concern. Many analysts expect the number of terrorist attacks in this
region to increase during the next decade. The newspaper Die Welt (the
World) reported that intelligence intercepts indicated the likelihood of
terrorist attacks in Germany on the run-up to its elections in the fall of
2009.26 Fortunately these attacks did not occur. However, al-Qaeda will
probably try to attack Western European targets in the foreseeable future.
Nonviolent Islamism has also grown much stronger in Turkey. As
long as the Islamist movement experiences success at the ballot box, it
may eschew the bomb. However, should the state’s historic guardians
of secularism, the Turkish military, reassert control as they have in the
past, this situation could change dramatically for the worse.
Africa has seen considerable growth in Islamist extremism in recent
years. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, a terrorist organization affi liated with
bin Laden’s group, links jihadists across much of North Africa. Somalia
has been a failed state for more than two decades, and Islamist extremists
now control much of the south and center of the country. The rise in
piracy off the Somali coast is both a symptom and a source of jihadist
activity. The collapse of the Somali economy, particularly its fi shing industry,
has encouraged young men to become pirates. The proceeds of
their activities fund Islamic groups operating in the country. The risk of
extremist activity spilling over the border into neighboring Kenya remains
considerable.
Even more troubling than the extent of al-Qaeda’s network is the
strength of its ideology. Osama bin Laden remains popular on the streets
of many Muslim countries, especially in the Arab world. After 9/11,
journalist-turned-novelist Rick Mofi na saw a young boy in Nigeria wearing
a t-shirt with a picture of Osama bin Laden and words proclaiming
him number 1 hero.27 The United States has had little success countering
his ideology among the young, poor, and disenfranchised. U.S. actions
during seven years of the so-called Global War on Terrorism have probably
made matters worse, deepening anger at U.S. unilateralism and heavyhandedness.
Things may, however, be changing. On June 4, 2009, President
Obama delivered an historic address to the Muslim world at one of
its oldest seats of learning, Cairo University. He acknowledged the deep
tension and mistrust that exists between the United States and Muslims.
Without backing away from America’s commitment to fi ght terrorism or
its historic ties to Israel, he appealed to his audience for better relations.
BIN LADEN AND AL-QAEDA, POST-9/11 107
“I’ve come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United
States and Muslims around the world,” he declared, “one based on mutual
interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America
and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition.”28 The
speech was well received by those in attendance but received mixed reviews
from those who heard via the media. Commentators in the Muslim
world viewed it with cautious optimism, waiting to see when and if words
would become deeds.
Among those paying closest attention to the president’s speech was
Osama bin Laden, who tried to pre-empt it with a statement of his own
issued the day before Obama spoke in Cairo. In a taped message sent to Al
Jazeera, bin Laden declared that President Obama had “sowed new seeds
of hatred against America.”29 He reminded his audience that, as the president
prepared to speak, Pakistani forces acting on America’s behalf were
displacing thousands of Muslims from their homes in the Swat Valley.
Less important than his words was bin Laden’s timing. He recognized in
the new president’s extended hand of friendship a threat to al-Qaeda potentially
more dangerous than all of George W. Bush’s military actions.
NOTES
1. Osama bin Laden, in Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (New
York: Free Press, 2006), p. 283.
2. Sulayman Abu Ghaith, quoted in ibid., p. 284.
3. Interview with Osama Bin Ladin by unidentified Ummat special correspondent,
in Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 – January 2004
(Washington, DC: Federal Broadcast Information Service 2004 ), p. 178.
4. Excerpts of al-Qaeda tape aired on Al Jazeera, aired April 18, 2002, in
ibid., pp. 192 – 193.
5. Ibid, p. 193.
6. Hamid Mir, in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know , p. 287.
7. Sayf Adel, quoted in Sarah E. Zaibel, The Military Strategy of Global Jihad
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007). p. 6, http://www.
StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ (accessed July 22, 2009).
8. Vahid Mojdeh, in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know , p. 325.
9. Peter Jouvenal, quoted in ibid., p. 323.
10. Osama bin Laden statement aired, October 7, 2001, in Raymond
Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Broadway Books, 2007), p. 194.
108 OSAMA BIN LADEN
11. See Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation
Anaconda (New York: Penguin, 2006).
12. Peter Jouvenal, in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know , p. 331.
13. Mohammed Musa, in ibid., p. 330.
14. Riedel, Search for Al-Qaeda , pp. 121 – 122.
15. Osama bin Laden, in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know , p. 337.
16. Osama bin Laden, transcript of statement on Al Jazeera television,
November 12, 2002, in Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements , p. 227.
17. Transcript of al Jazeera broadcast, in ibid., p. 270.
18. Details of Madrid bombing from MIPT Terrorism Data Base, http://
www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org /incidentcalendar.asp (accessed June 17, 2009).
19. Osama bin Laden, “Osama bin Laden’s Peace Treaty Offer to the Europeans,”
in Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Broadway
Books, 2007), p. 234.
20. Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 2006), p. 20.
21. Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New
York: Broadway Books, 2007), p. 238.
22. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11
(New York: Knopf, 2006), p. 318.
23. Osama bin Laden, message televised on Al Jazeera, October 18, 2003,
in Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements , p. 211.
24. Osama bin Laden, message televised on Al Jazeera, October 2004, in
ibid., p. 217.
25. Osama bin Laden, taped message, January 2006, in ibid., p. 221.
26. “Bundestagwahl im Visier von al-Qaieda,” Die Welt , July 5, 2009, p. 4.
27. Rick Mofina, Six Seconds (New York: Mira Books, 2009), p. 471.
28. President Barack Obama, transcript of Cairo University Speech, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-
University-6-04-09/ (accessed June 20, 2009).
29. Osama bin Laden, quoted in “Bin Laden Attacks Obama Policies,” Al
Jazeera English net, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/06/200
963123251920623.html (accessed June 20, 2009).
CONCLUSION
THE MAKING OF A TERRORIST
Osama bin Laden’s story is not, of course, fi nished, but its most important
chapters have been written. As of this writing, he is probably still alive,
despite some rumors to the contrary. He may be hiding somewhere along
the Afghan-Pakistan border in a lawless region of Pakistan known as the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. He might also be living the Pakistani
city of Quetta with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. Wherever
he is, he does not matter as much as he once did.
Neither bin Laden’s outlook nor his objectives have changed since
9/11. His many statements contain no new ideas and shed no new light on
bin Laden because there is no new light to shed. Bin Laden’s journey to
the dark side was completed sometime between 1992 and 1996, when the
last elements of his worldview fell into place. As a youth, he had chosen
the path of a devout Muslim. His high school gym teacher exposed him to
the ideas of radical Islam. This exposure deepened his piety and made him
more conservative, but they did not change how he lived. In classic fashion,
he pursued the greater jihad of leading a righteous life. By all accounts,
he was a good husband to his four wives and a loving father to all of his
children. His religious beliefs, however, had no political dimension. They
110 OSAMA BIN LADEN
began to acquire that dimension when he attended King Abdul Aziz University.
Although he studied economics, he never earned a degree. He
did, however, attend lectures by Mohammed Qutb and read the classic
works of his martyred brother, Sayid.
The ideas of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that the Qutb brothers
taught attracted bin Laden to the Islamist cause, but they did not launch
him on the course of jihad. The Afghan war against the Soviets provided
a cause upon which to focus his religious zeal, but he would probably not
have embraced that cause were it not for Abdullah Azzam. Even then, his
major contribution to the jihad was not as a fi ghter but as a funder and facilitator
helping other foreign mujahedeen journey to Afghanistan.
The step from recruiter to holy warrior was easily taken and perhaps
inevitable. Bin Laden had always been a doer. Never satisfi ed to watch or
merely direct, he needed to act. He lacked the experience and training to
be accepted as a commander by the seasoned Afghan fi ghters, so he raised
his own force of Arab mujahedeen and led them into battle. They performed
poorly and made a negligible contribution to the war. They did,
however, provide the core of a future terrorist group, and they helped to
create the bin Laden myth. The Afghan Arabs became al-Qaeda, and bin
Laden returned home and found himself lionized by Saudis who wished
to hear of his exploits.
Despite its enormous role in shaping his worldview, the Afghan war
did not guarantee that bin Laden would become a terrorist. Had circumstances
been different, he might have returned to the quiet life of a Saudi
businessman following a brief time on the speaking circuit. The Gulf War
eliminated that prospect. Osama bin Laden never got over his bitter disappointment
at Saudi leaders’ refusal to accept his offer of a mujahedeen
army to defend the kingdom and expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
When he went into voluntary exile in Sudan, he entered a hornet’s nest of
radical Islamist jihadism that completed his extremist education. By the
time he left Khartoum in 1996, he was committed to global jihad against
apostate Muslim regimes and the United States, which supported those
governments, and its allies around the world
WILL BIN LADEN BE CAUGHT?
In my work as a television commentator on international terrorism I am frequently
asked if the United States will ever apprehend Osama bin Laden.
CONCLUSION 111
Given his belief in martyrdom, I doubt he will ever allow himself to be
taken alive. He has tasked one of his bodyguards with shooting him if
need be to prevent his capture. Clearly he prefers death by his own hand
to captivity or execution by his enemies.
Even if bin Laden were taken alive, however, his capture would do little
to hamper al-Qaeda’s operations. Apprehending bin Laden would provide
a temporary morale boost in America’s long struggle against terrorism,
and it would be a triumph for justice to try and convict him. Putting him
to death would be a huge mistake, as it would create one more martyr for a
cause that celebrates martyrdom. The case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the “20th
hijacker,” illustrates this point. Moussaoui remained defi ant throughout
his trial and welcomed entering paradise as a shahid (martyr). A sentence
of life in prison without parole, however, shocked and dismayed
him. He later tried to withdraw his guilty plea. Clearly, Islamist terrorists
fear the oblivion of lifelong incarceration more than a glorifi ed death.
Bin Laden’s death or capture would have far less impact on al-Qaeda
than it would have had he been apprehended in 1998 or even 2001. The
terrorist group is not as hierarchically organized as it once was. Experts
now refer to “al-Qaeda central” to distinguish the organization in Pakistan
from its worldwide network of cells and affi liates. While al-Qaeda
central has recovered from the disruption of the 2002 invasion of Afghanistan,
its need to operate underground has probably forced it to become
more decentralized even in its Pakistani safe haven than it was when
it functioned openly in Kandahar. Al-Qaeda has long had a deep pool of
leadership talent and a seemingly inexhaustible supply of new recruits. The
loss of one leader may provide a temporary disruption but will probably
not be fatal in the long run. Anyone who believes otherwise would do well
to remember Paul Bremer’s gleeful announcement on the capture of Saddam
Hussein (“We got him!”) and how little his capture effected the insurgency.
Eliminating bin Laden might have little effect for another reason: his
precise role in the organization remains unclear. Virtually all experts acknowledge
his importance as a fundraiser and spokesman. His prominence
and the U.S. efforts to demonize him in the aftermath of the East Africa
embassy bombings increased his public relations value enormously. Much
of the Arab street still considers him a hero, and at least some of his associates
have described him as “charismatic,” although this conclusion is
by no means a consensus. What remains less clear is the role bin Laden
112 OSAMA BIN LADEN
has played in the day-to-day operation of al-Qaeda. His more public role
in the Afghan war against the Soviets does not speak well of his organizational
ability. He was not the brains behind the Afghan Services Offi
ce. His one seemingly independent venture, the creation of an Afghan
Arab contingent capable of fi ghting independently, was poorly conceived
and badly executed. It may well be that the other foreign mujahedeen tolerated
him for the money he brought them. He was a founding member
of al-Qaeda but does not seem to have designed its structure or entirely directed
its activities. It is debatable whether he or Zawahiri took it global.
He may have lent it some of his indefatigable energy and was invaluable
during the 1990s as its public face. However, those contributions no longer
matter as much now that the global jihad has been launched. In sum,
while al-Qaeda would not wish to lose Osama bin Laden, it can certainly do
without him. He may have been more useful to the movement as a myth
than a man, but even that usefulness has waned.
PORTRAIT OF A TERRORIST
What has emerged from this account is, I hope, the outline of a person’s
life, a portrait of his organization, an analysis of his heroic myth, and an understanding
of the larger ideological movement to which he belongs. A
biography of Osama bin Laden detailing even the majority of his life may
never be possible. Future historians will have more sources than contemporary
ones, but it seems doubtful that these documents will shed much
light on his formative early years. The recollections of those who knew
him are what writers have today and probably all that they will have in
the future. His family members have maintained a conspiracy of silence
about their wayward member, who is undoubtedly bad for business. It remains
to be seen whether any of them will be more forthcoming in the
years ahead. Perhaps years from now one of his children or grandchildren
will fi ll in the huge gaps in his life that Western writers currently encounter.
Even with the limitations of available evidence, however, it is possible
to identify formative events that shaped bin Laden’s character and personality.
The death of Mohammed bin Laden when Osama was only nine
seems to have profoundly impacted the child’s psyche. Mohammed was a
stern but loving father whom his young son revered. His death created
CONCLUSION 113
a void that would be hard to fi ll. Bin Laden’s later impressionability and
his need for approval may stem from this early loss. His high school gym
teacher, Mohammed Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, and Ayman al-Zawahiri each
in turn exploited this impressionability. On the other hand, Mohammed
bin Laden spent relatively little time with Osama, and many children
lose fathers at an early age without growing up to become terrorists. In the
patriarch’s extended family, the young bin Laden should have had plenty
of positive male role models and good mentors to take the place of his father.
Since the al-Qaeda leader will probably not consent to therapy, developing
an accurate psychological profi le of him will never be possible.
Nevertheless, this study does make possible some tentative conclusions
about the personality of the world’s most wanted man. By all accounts,
Osama bin Laden was a shy, unassuming young man. His teachers credit
him with above-average intelligence, but he received average grades. His
unwillingness to speak up in class no doubt hurt his academic performance.
He appears to have been well mannered and honest. He showed
no violent tendencies growing up, nor was he even particularly competitive.
Members of his soccer team describe him as a talented but indifferent
player. Beyond these superfi cial observations, the only thing acquaintances
seem to remember about Osama is his unusual height.
A somewhat larger body of sources documents the evolution of bin
Laden’s religious worldview. He was clearly more devout than most of his
siblings and friends, although none of them found his piety unusual or
problematic. It seems that every wealthy Saudi family produced at least
one such devout member. Bin Laden’s worldview blended Saudi Wahhabism
with the radical Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood, articulated most
fully by Sayid Qutb. Qutb convinced bin Laden of the need for a purely
Islamic answer to the problems of modernity, a way to reconcile modern
technology with traditional Muslim belief and practice.
Qutb did not, however, provide the ideological grounding for jihad.
Like most members of the Muslim Brotherhood, he preferred to work
within legitimate politics, gaining power through the ballot box, not the
gun or the bomb. His successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, did not share this evolutionary
view. The execution of Qutb, the brutal suppression of the Brotherhood,
and his own torture at the hands of the Egyptian security services
following the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat convinced
him that Islamism could never triumph through the democratic process.
114 OSAMA BIN LADEN
His al-Jihad organization broke with the Brotherhood on the issue of violence.
Zawahiri also believed, contrary to traditional Islamic teaching, that
the Qu’ran permitted violent overthrow of apostate regimes. Zawahiri
completed bin Laden’s jihadist education, beginning in Pakistan during
the Afghan war against the Soviets and concluding in Sudan during bin
Laden’s voluntary exile there.
THE TIMES AND THE MAN
I began this study with a question that perennially vexes historians: do individuals
make history, or do circumstances call forth individuals? In the
case of Osama bin Laden, the second answer seems more accurate. Events
shaped him more than he shaped them, and, had he not stepped up to become
the face of al-Qaeda, someone else almost certainly would have. He
may have had some ability to get diverse groups and individuals to work
together, but he was probably not responsible for organizing the group
and showed little interest in its day-to-day functions. Al-Qaeda’s most successful
attacks were conceived and planned by others, although he probably
had to approve them. Bin Laden was also not an original thinker. His
pronouncements, which he may not have written himself, contain a generic
list of radical Islamist grievances and platitudes. The evolution of
his thought can be traced by recounting the list of radicals with whom he
came in contact. Even his alleged charisma is suspect. Prior to his emergence
on the world stage, no one seems to have described bin Laden as charismatic.
After he achieved notoriety, few people got close enough to him
to fi nd out. Those who did were either already committed to jihad or journalists
invited in for carefully staged and closely scripted interviews.
In her thought-provoking study A Hundred Osamas, Sherifa Zuhur
makes a compelling case that the Islamist talent pool is so deep that the
movement will have no trouble replacing any number of leaders killed or
captured by the United States. She cites the case of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
as an example. In September 2003, Zarqawi created the Organization for
Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers, generally dubbed “Al-Qaeda in Iraq.”
His organization wreaked havoc in Iraq for three years before the United
States killed Zarqawi by bombing his safe house. The main al-Qaeda organization
regrouping in Pakistan did not create Zarqawi’s organization.
He chose to link up with them. For a few years, he even eclipsed Osama
CONCLUSION 115
bin Laden in the media. Once again, the event (in this case the U.S. invasion
of Iraq) called forth the man. Perhaps only timing and circumstances
kept Zarqawi from the lead role bin Laden got to play. 1
Had Osama bin Laden been born in economically disadvantaged circumstances
and yet developed the same convictions, he would probably
still have been recruited to the jihadist cause but perhaps in a very different
capacity. In many respects, he fi ts the profi le of the ideal suicide
bomber. He was a deeply impressionable young man, unswervingly loyal
to his convictions and to those who shared them. Possessed of an unshakable
faith and unfl inching courage, he genuinely believes that he acts on
God’s behalf and will be rewarded for his service to the cause, convictions
he shares with everyone who ever blew himself up in the name of God.
In the fi nal analysis, bin Laden’s most important contribution to al-
Qaeda, besides the considerable resources he commanded, may be his role
as mythic hero. From streets to palaces, he has become the symbol and
the embodiment of opposition for all those who see Islam under siege or
whose aspirations for a better life are blocked by circumstances beyond
their control. His willingness to forgo a life of luxury for one of hardship
earns him the respect of many whose suffering and want are hardly matters
of choice. Countering the threat posed by such a leader lies not in killing
or capturing him but in removing the circumstances that called him
forth in the fi rst place and that continue to make him popular.
NOTE
1 . Sherifa Zuhur, A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of
Counterinsurgency (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).
This page intentionally left blank
APPENDIX: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS
The documents in this section represent a small percentage of the sources
used to produce this book. To facilitate understanding, a brief commentary
precedes each source. The sources are arranged chronologically, illustrating
how the United States’ understanding of al-Qaeda and the
threat it poses has evolved over time.
Document 1
The 1997 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report makes scant mention of Osama
bin Laden but does acknowledge his influence on and contribution to terrorist
activities around the world. The report does not seem to consider him a
serious threat to the United States. The report is available at http://www.
hri.org/docs/USSD-Terror/97/asia.html.
AFGHANISTAN
Islamic extremists from around the world — including large numbers of
Egyptians, Algerians, Palestinians, and Saudis — continued to use Afghanistan
as a training ground and home base from which to operate in
118 APPENDIX
1997. The Taliban, as well as many of the other combatants in the Afghan
civil war, facilitated the operation of training and indoctrination
facilities for non-Afghans in the territories they controlled. Several Afghani
factions also provided logistic support, free passage, and sometimes
passports to the members of various terrorist organizations. These individuals,
in turn, were involved in fi ghting in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, the Philippines, and parts of the Middle
East.
Saudi-born terrorist fi nancier Usama Bin Ladin relocated from Jalalabad
to the Taliban’s capital of Qandahar in early 1997 and established
a new base of operations. He continued to incite violence against the
United States, particularly against US forces in Saudi Arabia. Bin Ladin
called on Muslims to retaliate against the US prosecutor in the Mir Aimal
Kansi trial for disparaging comments he made about Pakistanis and
praised the Pakistan-based Kashmiri group HUA in the wake of its formal
designation as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States.
According to the Pakistani press, following Kansi’s rendition to the
United States, Bin Ladin warned the United States that, if it attempted
his capture, he would “teach them a lesson similar to the lesson they were
taught in Somalia.”
Document 2
The East Africa embassy bombings brought Osama bin Laden to the attention
of the American public. Although al-Qaeda had been in existence for
almost a decade, bin Laden was added to the U.S. terrorism list only after
the August 1998 attacks in Nairobi and Darussalam. The text of this State
Department report is available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/ terror
ism/1998Report/intro.html#foot1.
Following the bombings of the two US Embassies in East Africa, the US
Government obtained evidence implicating Usama Bin Ladin’s network
in the attacks. To preempt additional attacks, the United States
launched military strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan
on 20 August. That same day, President Clinton amended Executive
Order 12947 to add Usama Bin Ladin and his key associates to the list
of terrorists, thus blocking their US assets — including property and bank
APPENDIX 119
accounts — and prohibiting all US fi nancial transactions with them. As
a result of what Attorney General Janet Reno called the most extensive
overseas criminal investigation in US history, and working closely with
the Kenyan and Tanzanian Governments, the US Government indicted
Bin Ladin and 11 of his associates for the two bombings and other terrorist
crimes. Several suspects were brought to the United States to stand
trial. The Department of State announced a reward of up to $5 million
for information leading to the arrest or conviction of any of the suspects
anywhere in the world.
Document 3
Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa is a declaration of war against the United
States and its allies. It represents the culmination of his political/religious
worldview. The document is available at http:// www.fas.org/ irp/ world/para/
docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders
World Islamic Front Statement
23 February 1998
Shaykh Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin
Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt
Abu-Yasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group
Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan
Fazlur Rahman, amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh
Praise be to Allah, who revealed the Book, controls the clouds, defeats
factionalism, and says in His Book: “ But when the forbidden months are
past, then fi ght and slay the pagans wherever ye fi nd them, seize them,
beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)”;
and peace be upon our Prophet, Muhammad Bin-’Abdallah, who said:
I have been sent with the sword between my hands to ensure that no one
but Allah is worshipped, Allah who put my livelihood under the shadow
of my spear and who infl icts humiliation and scorn on those who disobey
my orders.
The Arabian Peninsula has never — since Allah made it fl at, created
its desert, and encircled it with seas — been stormed by any forces like
120 APPENDIX
the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping
out its plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations
are attacking Muslims like people fi ghting over a plate of food. In the
light of the grave situation and the lack of support, we and you are obliged
to discuss current events, and we should all agree on how to settle the
matter.
No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone;
we will list them, in order to remind everyone:
First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the
lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering
its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing
its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead
through which to fi ght the neighboring Muslim peoples.
If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation,
all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The
best proof of this is the Americans’ continuing aggression against the
Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its
rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are
helpless.
Second, despite the great devastation infl icted on the Iraqi people
by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those
killed, which has exceeded 1 million . . . despite all this, the Americans
are once again trying to repeat the horrifi c massacres, as though they are
not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious
war or the fragmentation and devastation.
So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate
their Muslim neighbors.
Third, if the Americans’ aims behind these wars are religious and economic,
the aim is also to serve the Jews’ petty state and divert attention
from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best
proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring
Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region
such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and
through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel’s survival and
the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula.
All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration
of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have
APPENDIX 121
throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual
duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed
by Imam Bin-Qadamah in “Al- Mughni,” Imam al-Kisa’i in “Al-Bada’i,”
al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the shaykh of al-Islam in his books,
where he said: “As for the fi ghting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at
defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [ by the ulema].
Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is
attacking religion and life.”
On that basis, and in compliance with Allah’s order, we issue the following
fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their
allies — civilians and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim
who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to
liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [ Mecca] from their
grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam,
defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with
the words of Almighty Allah, “and fi ght the pagans all together as they
fi ght you all together,” and “fi ght them until there is no more tumult or
oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.”
This is in addition to the words of Almighty Allah: “And why should
ye not fi ght in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are
ill-treated (and oppressed)? — women and children, whose cry is: ‘Our
Lord, rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise
for us from the one who will help!’ ”
We — with Allah’s help — call on every Muslim who believes in
Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah’s order to kill the
Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they fi nd
it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch
the raid on Satan’s U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with
them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn
a lesson.
Almighty Allah said: “O ye who believe, give your response to Allah
and His Apostle, when He calleth you to that which will give you life.
And know that Allah cometh between a man and his heart, and that it
is He to whom ye shall all be gathered.”
Almighty Allah also says: “O ye who believe, what is the matter with
you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, ye cling so
heavily to the earth! Do ye prefer the life of this world to the hereafter?
122 APPENDIX
But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the hereafter. Unless
ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others
in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For Allah
hath power over all things.”
Almighty Allah also says: “So lose no heart, nor fall into despair. For
ye must gain mastery if ye are true in faith.”
Document 4
A grand jury indicted bin Laden and his associates for the East Africa bombings.
Following is the introduction to the indictment and its first count. The
entire document is available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.find law.com/
hdocs/docs/ binladen/usbinladen1.pdf.
The Grand Jury charges:
Background: Al Qaeda
1. At all relevant times from in or about 1989 until the date of
the fi ling of this Indictment, an international terrorist group
existed which was dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments
with force and violence. This organization grew out of
the “mekhtab al khidemat” (the “Services Offi ce”) organization
which had maintained offi ces in various parts of the world, including
Afghanistan, Pakistan ( particularly in Peshawar) and
the United States, particularly at the Alkifah Refugee Center
in Brooklyn, New York. The group was founded by defendants
USAMA BIN LADEN and MUHAMMAD ATEF, a/ k/a “Abu
Hafs al Masry,” together with “Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri” and others.
From in or about 1989 until the present, the group called
itself “al Qaeda” (“the Base”). From 1989 until in or about 1991,
the group (hereafter referred to as “al Qaeda”) was headquartered
in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. In or about 1991,
the leadership of al Qaeda, including its “emir ” (or prince) defendant
USAMA BIN LADEN, relocated to the Sudan. Al
Qaeda was headquartered in the Sudan from approximately
1991 until approximately 1996 but still maintained offi ces in
APPENDIX 123
various parts of the world. In 1996, defendants USAMA BIN
LADEN and MUHAMMAD ATEF and other members of al
Qaeda relocated to Afghanistan. At all relevant times, al Qaeda
was led by its emir, defendant USAMA BIN LADEN. Members
of al Qaeda pledged an oath of allegiance (called a “ bayat”)
to defendant USAMA BIN LADEN and al Qaeda. Those who
were suspected of collaborating against al Qaeda were to be
identifi ed and killed.
2. Al Qaeda opposed the United States for several reasons. First,
the United States was regarded as an “infi del” because it was not
governed in a manner consistent with the group’s extremist interpretation
of Islam. Second, the United States was viewed as
providing essential support for other “infi del” governments and
institutions, particularly the governments of Saudi Arabia and
Egypt, the nation of Israel and the United Nations organization,
which were regarded as enemies of the group. Third, al Qaeda
opposed the involvement of the United States armed forces in
the Gulf War in 1991 and in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
in 1992 and 1993, which were viewed by al Qaeda as pretextual
preparations for an American occupation of Islamic countries. In
particular, al Qaeda opposed the continued presence of American
military forces in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi
Arabian peninsula) following the Gulf War. Fourth, al Qaeda
opposed the United States Government because of the arrest,
conviction and imprisonment of persons belonging to al Qaeda
or its affi liated terrorist groups or with whom it worked, including
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.
3. One of the principal goals of al Qaeda was to drive the United
States armed forces out of Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the
Saudi Arabian peninsula) and Somalia by violence. Members
of al Qaeda issued fatwahs (rulings on Islamic law) indicating
that such attacks were both proper and necessary.
4. From in or about 1993, until in or about December 1999,
AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI, a/ k/a “Abdel Muaz,” a / k/a “ Dr. Ayman
al Zawahiri,” a/ k/a “the Doctor,” a/ k/a “ Nur,” a/ k/a “ Ustaz,” a/ k/a
“Abu Mohammed,” a / k/a “Abu Mohammed Nur al-Deen,” led
124 APPENDIX
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad which was dedicated to the forceful
overthrow of the Egyptian Government and to violent opposition
of the United States, in part, for its support of the Government
in Egypt. Members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad also pledged
allegiance to AL ZAWAHIRI and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Many
of the leading members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad became
infl uential members of al Qaeda, including defendants AYMAN
AL ZAWAHIRI and MUHAMMAD ATEF. Eventually, by at
least in or about February 1998, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad led
by AL ZAWAHIRI had effectively merged with al Qaeda and
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad joined with al Qaeda in targeting
American civilians.
al-Qaeda claimed victory. Italy, too, left the coalition following the deaths
of 12 of its soldiers in Iraq.
On the eve of the 2004 presidential election, bin Laden spoke again
to the American people. He admonished them to repudiate the wicked
policies of their government and explained al-Qaeda’s long-term strategy
of attrition. “All we had to do was send two mujahedeen to the farthest
east to raise aloft a piece of rag with the words ‘al-Qaeda’ written on it, and
the [U.S.] generals came a-scurrying — causing America to suffer human,
economic, and political damages while accomplishing nothing worth
mentioning aside from providing business [contracts] for their private
corporations,” he explained.
On the other hand, we have gained experience in guerrilla and attritional
warfare in our jihad against the great and wicked superpower,
Russia, which we, along-side the mujahedeen , fought for ten years
until, bankrupt, it was forced to withdraw [out of Afghanistan in
1989] — all praise be to Allah! And so we are continuing the same
policy: to make America bleed till it becomes bankrupt.24
Following this message, bin Laden stayed off the airwaves for more
than a year. Then, in January 2006, he released an audiotape in which
he offered the American people a truce. If the United States would
withdraw its forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda would cease
its campaign of terror against it. “The war in Iraq is raging without end
[in sight]; the operations in Afghanistan are continually escalating in
our favor — praise be to Allah,” he stated, reiterating the cost of the war
in U.S. blood and treasure. “Pentagon fi gures show an increase in your
casualties and wounded — let alone the massive economic loses, the
destruction of soldiers’ morale there, and an increase [in cases] of suicide
among them.”25 Neither war was going well at the time, but it is hard to
believe that bin Laden could have been so deluded as to believe that the
White House or the public would take his offer seriously. As with most
of his pronouncements, the real audience was probably his supporters
in the Muslim world. He reminded them periodically of the justness of
al-Qaeda’s cause and of its inevitable ultimate triumph.
BIN LADEN AND AL-QAEDA, POST-9/11 105
THE AL-QAEDA THREAT
As al-Qaeda has gone deeper underground, gaining precise information
on its strength and capabilities has become increasingly diffi cult. Sources
available in the public domain allow only tentative conclusions. Twenty
years after its creation and eight years after its most dramatic success, al-
Qaeda remains a formidable threat. The central organization has rebuilt
itself in the ungoverned border lands between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In cooperation with the Taliban, it continues to wage a protracted war
to regain control of Afghanistan and threatens the stability of Pakistan.
It can still direct operations abroad, although efforts by the West appear
to have diminished its capacity to concentrate resources and talent for
dramatic strikes like the East Africa bombings and 9/11.
The election of Democratic President Barack Obama in November
2008 has led to a change in U.S. military strategy. Obama has begun reducing
the U.S. presence in Iraq and shifting troops to Afghanistan. The
United States has also put increasing pressure on the new government
in Pakistan to take more aggressive action against al-Qaeda and Taliban
members operating on its soil. In the spring of 2009, the Pakistani
army launched an offensive against Taliban forces in the Swat Valley on
its northwest frontier with Afghanistan. In early July, 4,000 U.S. Marines,
in cooperation with Afghan forces, launched an offensive to regain control
of Helmund Province, while Pakistani troops blocked escape routes
on their side of the border. The offensive was part of Washington’s new
“clear and hold” strategy, made possible by increasing U.S. troop strength
by more than 20,000. In the fall the Pakistanis moved against the Taliban
stronghold in South Waziristan.
Gauging the strength of al-Qaeda’s global network of cells and affi liates
is even more diffi cult than assessing the capabilities of the central
organization. A steady, highly effective, and largely unnoticed campaign
supported by U.S. Special Forces has crippled its ability to operate in the
Philippines. Islamist extremism in Indonesia also appears to have waned
since the days of the Bali bombing. In other areas of the world, however,
the al-Qaeda network may have grown stronger. Filled with secondgeneration
young men resentful of their low status and lack of opportunity,
the Muslim communities in Western Europe remain a cause of
106 OSAMA BIN LADEN
concern. Many analysts expect the number of terrorist attacks in this
region to increase during the next decade. The newspaper Die Welt (the
World) reported that intelligence intercepts indicated the likelihood of
terrorist attacks in Germany on the run-up to its elections in the fall of
2009.26 Fortunately these attacks did not occur. However, al-Qaeda will
probably try to attack Western European targets in the foreseeable future.
Nonviolent Islamism has also grown much stronger in Turkey. As
long as the Islamist movement experiences success at the ballot box, it
may eschew the bomb. However, should the state’s historic guardians
of secularism, the Turkish military, reassert control as they have in the
past, this situation could change dramatically for the worse.
Africa has seen considerable growth in Islamist extremism in recent
years. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, a terrorist organization affi liated with
bin Laden’s group, links jihadists across much of North Africa. Somalia
has been a failed state for more than two decades, and Islamist extremists
now control much of the south and center of the country. The rise in
piracy off the Somali coast is both a symptom and a source of jihadist
activity. The collapse of the Somali economy, particularly its fi shing industry,
has encouraged young men to become pirates. The proceeds of
their activities fund Islamic groups operating in the country. The risk of
extremist activity spilling over the border into neighboring Kenya remains
considerable.
Even more troubling than the extent of al-Qaeda’s network is the
strength of its ideology. Osama bin Laden remains popular on the streets
of many Muslim countries, especially in the Arab world. After 9/11,
journalist-turned-novelist Rick Mofi na saw a young boy in Nigeria wearing
a t-shirt with a picture of Osama bin Laden and words proclaiming
him number 1 hero.27 The United States has had little success countering
his ideology among the young, poor, and disenfranchised. U.S. actions
during seven years of the so-called Global War on Terrorism have probably
made matters worse, deepening anger at U.S. unilateralism and heavyhandedness.
Things may, however, be changing. On June 4, 2009, President
Obama delivered an historic address to the Muslim world at one of
its oldest seats of learning, Cairo University. He acknowledged the deep
tension and mistrust that exists between the United States and Muslims.
Without backing away from America’s commitment to fi ght terrorism or
its historic ties to Israel, he appealed to his audience for better relations.
BIN LADEN AND AL-QAEDA, POST-9/11 107
“I’ve come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United
States and Muslims around the world,” he declared, “one based on mutual
interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America
and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition.”28 The
speech was well received by those in attendance but received mixed reviews
from those who heard via the media. Commentators in the Muslim
world viewed it with cautious optimism, waiting to see when and if words
would become deeds.
Among those paying closest attention to the president’s speech was
Osama bin Laden, who tried to pre-empt it with a statement of his own
issued the day before Obama spoke in Cairo. In a taped message sent to Al
Jazeera, bin Laden declared that President Obama had “sowed new seeds
of hatred against America.”29 He reminded his audience that, as the president
prepared to speak, Pakistani forces acting on America’s behalf were
displacing thousands of Muslims from their homes in the Swat Valley.
Less important than his words was bin Laden’s timing. He recognized in
the new president’s extended hand of friendship a threat to al-Qaeda potentially
more dangerous than all of George W. Bush’s military actions.
NOTES
1. Osama bin Laden, in Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (New
York: Free Press, 2006), p. 283.
2. Sulayman Abu Ghaith, quoted in ibid., p. 284.
3. Interview with Osama Bin Ladin by unidentified Ummat special correspondent,
in Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 – January 2004
(Washington, DC: Federal Broadcast Information Service 2004 ), p. 178.
4. Excerpts of al-Qaeda tape aired on Al Jazeera, aired April 18, 2002, in
ibid., pp. 192 – 193.
5. Ibid, p. 193.
6. Hamid Mir, in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know , p. 287.
7. Sayf Adel, quoted in Sarah E. Zaibel, The Military Strategy of Global Jihad
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007). p. 6, http://www.
StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ (accessed July 22, 2009).
8. Vahid Mojdeh, in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know , p. 325.
9. Peter Jouvenal, quoted in ibid., p. 323.
10. Osama bin Laden statement aired, October 7, 2001, in Raymond
Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Broadway Books, 2007), p. 194.
108 OSAMA BIN LADEN
11. See Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation
Anaconda (New York: Penguin, 2006).
12. Peter Jouvenal, in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know , p. 331.
13. Mohammed Musa, in ibid., p. 330.
14. Riedel, Search for Al-Qaeda , pp. 121 – 122.
15. Osama bin Laden, in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know , p. 337.
16. Osama bin Laden, transcript of statement on Al Jazeera television,
November 12, 2002, in Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements , p. 227.
17. Transcript of al Jazeera broadcast, in ibid., p. 270.
18. Details of Madrid bombing from MIPT Terrorism Data Base, http://
www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org /incidentcalendar.asp (accessed June 17, 2009).
19. Osama bin Laden, “Osama bin Laden’s Peace Treaty Offer to the Europeans,”
in Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Broadway
Books, 2007), p. 234.
20. Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 2006), p. 20.
21. Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New
York: Broadway Books, 2007), p. 238.
22. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11
(New York: Knopf, 2006), p. 318.
23. Osama bin Laden, message televised on Al Jazeera, October 18, 2003,
in Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements , p. 211.
24. Osama bin Laden, message televised on Al Jazeera, October 2004, in
ibid., p. 217.
25. Osama bin Laden, taped message, January 2006, in ibid., p. 221.
26. “Bundestagwahl im Visier von al-Qaieda,” Die Welt , July 5, 2009, p. 4.
27. Rick Mofina, Six Seconds (New York: Mira Books, 2009), p. 471.
28. President Barack Obama, transcript of Cairo University Speech, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-
University-6-04-09/ (accessed June 20, 2009).
29. Osama bin Laden, quoted in “Bin Laden Attacks Obama Policies,” Al
Jazeera English net, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/06/200
963123251920623.html (accessed June 20, 2009).
CONCLUSION
THE MAKING OF A TERRORIST
Osama bin Laden’s story is not, of course, fi nished, but its most important
chapters have been written. As of this writing, he is probably still alive,
despite some rumors to the contrary. He may be hiding somewhere along
the Afghan-Pakistan border in a lawless region of Pakistan known as the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. He might also be living the Pakistani
city of Quetta with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. Wherever
he is, he does not matter as much as he once did.
Neither bin Laden’s outlook nor his objectives have changed since
9/11. His many statements contain no new ideas and shed no new light on
bin Laden because there is no new light to shed. Bin Laden’s journey to
the dark side was completed sometime between 1992 and 1996, when the
last elements of his worldview fell into place. As a youth, he had chosen
the path of a devout Muslim. His high school gym teacher exposed him to
the ideas of radical Islam. This exposure deepened his piety and made him
more conservative, but they did not change how he lived. In classic fashion,
he pursued the greater jihad of leading a righteous life. By all accounts,
he was a good husband to his four wives and a loving father to all of his
children. His religious beliefs, however, had no political dimension. They
110 OSAMA BIN LADEN
began to acquire that dimension when he attended King Abdul Aziz University.
Although he studied economics, he never earned a degree. He
did, however, attend lectures by Mohammed Qutb and read the classic
works of his martyred brother, Sayid.
The ideas of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that the Qutb brothers
taught attracted bin Laden to the Islamist cause, but they did not launch
him on the course of jihad. The Afghan war against the Soviets provided
a cause upon which to focus his religious zeal, but he would probably not
have embraced that cause were it not for Abdullah Azzam. Even then, his
major contribution to the jihad was not as a fi ghter but as a funder and facilitator
helping other foreign mujahedeen journey to Afghanistan.
The step from recruiter to holy warrior was easily taken and perhaps
inevitable. Bin Laden had always been a doer. Never satisfi ed to watch or
merely direct, he needed to act. He lacked the experience and training to
be accepted as a commander by the seasoned Afghan fi ghters, so he raised
his own force of Arab mujahedeen and led them into battle. They performed
poorly and made a negligible contribution to the war. They did,
however, provide the core of a future terrorist group, and they helped to
create the bin Laden myth. The Afghan Arabs became al-Qaeda, and bin
Laden returned home and found himself lionized by Saudis who wished
to hear of his exploits.
Despite its enormous role in shaping his worldview, the Afghan war
did not guarantee that bin Laden would become a terrorist. Had circumstances
been different, he might have returned to the quiet life of a Saudi
businessman following a brief time on the speaking circuit. The Gulf War
eliminated that prospect. Osama bin Laden never got over his bitter disappointment
at Saudi leaders’ refusal to accept his offer of a mujahedeen
army to defend the kingdom and expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
When he went into voluntary exile in Sudan, he entered a hornet’s nest of
radical Islamist jihadism that completed his extremist education. By the
time he left Khartoum in 1996, he was committed to global jihad against
apostate Muslim regimes and the United States, which supported those
governments, and its allies around the world
WILL BIN LADEN BE CAUGHT?
In my work as a television commentator on international terrorism I am frequently
asked if the United States will ever apprehend Osama bin Laden.
CONCLUSION 111
Given his belief in martyrdom, I doubt he will ever allow himself to be
taken alive. He has tasked one of his bodyguards with shooting him if
need be to prevent his capture. Clearly he prefers death by his own hand
to captivity or execution by his enemies.
Even if bin Laden were taken alive, however, his capture would do little
to hamper al-Qaeda’s operations. Apprehending bin Laden would provide
a temporary morale boost in America’s long struggle against terrorism,
and it would be a triumph for justice to try and convict him. Putting him
to death would be a huge mistake, as it would create one more martyr for a
cause that celebrates martyrdom. The case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the “20th
hijacker,” illustrates this point. Moussaoui remained defi ant throughout
his trial and welcomed entering paradise as a shahid (martyr). A sentence
of life in prison without parole, however, shocked and dismayed
him. He later tried to withdraw his guilty plea. Clearly, Islamist terrorists
fear the oblivion of lifelong incarceration more than a glorifi ed death.
Bin Laden’s death or capture would have far less impact on al-Qaeda
than it would have had he been apprehended in 1998 or even 2001. The
terrorist group is not as hierarchically organized as it once was. Experts
now refer to “al-Qaeda central” to distinguish the organization in Pakistan
from its worldwide network of cells and affi liates. While al-Qaeda
central has recovered from the disruption of the 2002 invasion of Afghanistan,
its need to operate underground has probably forced it to become
more decentralized even in its Pakistani safe haven than it was when
it functioned openly in Kandahar. Al-Qaeda has long had a deep pool of
leadership talent and a seemingly inexhaustible supply of new recruits. The
loss of one leader may provide a temporary disruption but will probably
not be fatal in the long run. Anyone who believes otherwise would do well
to remember Paul Bremer’s gleeful announcement on the capture of Saddam
Hussein (“We got him!”) and how little his capture effected the insurgency.
Eliminating bin Laden might have little effect for another reason: his
precise role in the organization remains unclear. Virtually all experts acknowledge
his importance as a fundraiser and spokesman. His prominence
and the U.S. efforts to demonize him in the aftermath of the East Africa
embassy bombings increased his public relations value enormously. Much
of the Arab street still considers him a hero, and at least some of his associates
have described him as “charismatic,” although this conclusion is
by no means a consensus. What remains less clear is the role bin Laden
112 OSAMA BIN LADEN
has played in the day-to-day operation of al-Qaeda. His more public role
in the Afghan war against the Soviets does not speak well of his organizational
ability. He was not the brains behind the Afghan Services Offi
ce. His one seemingly independent venture, the creation of an Afghan
Arab contingent capable of fi ghting independently, was poorly conceived
and badly executed. It may well be that the other foreign mujahedeen tolerated
him for the money he brought them. He was a founding member
of al-Qaeda but does not seem to have designed its structure or entirely directed
its activities. It is debatable whether he or Zawahiri took it global.
He may have lent it some of his indefatigable energy and was invaluable
during the 1990s as its public face. However, those contributions no longer
matter as much now that the global jihad has been launched. In sum,
while al-Qaeda would not wish to lose Osama bin Laden, it can certainly do
without him. He may have been more useful to the movement as a myth
than a man, but even that usefulness has waned.
PORTRAIT OF A TERRORIST
What has emerged from this account is, I hope, the outline of a person’s
life, a portrait of his organization, an analysis of his heroic myth, and an understanding
of the larger ideological movement to which he belongs. A
biography of Osama bin Laden detailing even the majority of his life may
never be possible. Future historians will have more sources than contemporary
ones, but it seems doubtful that these documents will shed much
light on his formative early years. The recollections of those who knew
him are what writers have today and probably all that they will have in
the future. His family members have maintained a conspiracy of silence
about their wayward member, who is undoubtedly bad for business. It remains
to be seen whether any of them will be more forthcoming in the
years ahead. Perhaps years from now one of his children or grandchildren
will fi ll in the huge gaps in his life that Western writers currently encounter.
Even with the limitations of available evidence, however, it is possible
to identify formative events that shaped bin Laden’s character and personality.
The death of Mohammed bin Laden when Osama was only nine
seems to have profoundly impacted the child’s psyche. Mohammed was a
stern but loving father whom his young son revered. His death created
CONCLUSION 113
a void that would be hard to fi ll. Bin Laden’s later impressionability and
his need for approval may stem from this early loss. His high school gym
teacher, Mohammed Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, and Ayman al-Zawahiri each
in turn exploited this impressionability. On the other hand, Mohammed
bin Laden spent relatively little time with Osama, and many children
lose fathers at an early age without growing up to become terrorists. In the
patriarch’s extended family, the young bin Laden should have had plenty
of positive male role models and good mentors to take the place of his father.
Since the al-Qaeda leader will probably not consent to therapy, developing
an accurate psychological profi le of him will never be possible.
Nevertheless, this study does make possible some tentative conclusions
about the personality of the world’s most wanted man. By all accounts,
Osama bin Laden was a shy, unassuming young man. His teachers credit
him with above-average intelligence, but he received average grades. His
unwillingness to speak up in class no doubt hurt his academic performance.
He appears to have been well mannered and honest. He showed
no violent tendencies growing up, nor was he even particularly competitive.
Members of his soccer team describe him as a talented but indifferent
player. Beyond these superfi cial observations, the only thing acquaintances
seem to remember about Osama is his unusual height.
A somewhat larger body of sources documents the evolution of bin
Laden’s religious worldview. He was clearly more devout than most of his
siblings and friends, although none of them found his piety unusual or
problematic. It seems that every wealthy Saudi family produced at least
one such devout member. Bin Laden’s worldview blended Saudi Wahhabism
with the radical Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood, articulated most
fully by Sayid Qutb. Qutb convinced bin Laden of the need for a purely
Islamic answer to the problems of modernity, a way to reconcile modern
technology with traditional Muslim belief and practice.
Qutb did not, however, provide the ideological grounding for jihad.
Like most members of the Muslim Brotherhood, he preferred to work
within legitimate politics, gaining power through the ballot box, not the
gun or the bomb. His successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, did not share this evolutionary
view. The execution of Qutb, the brutal suppression of the Brotherhood,
and his own torture at the hands of the Egyptian security services
following the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat convinced
him that Islamism could never triumph through the democratic process.
114 OSAMA BIN LADEN
His al-Jihad organization broke with the Brotherhood on the issue of violence.
Zawahiri also believed, contrary to traditional Islamic teaching, that
the Qu’ran permitted violent overthrow of apostate regimes. Zawahiri
completed bin Laden’s jihadist education, beginning in Pakistan during
the Afghan war against the Soviets and concluding in Sudan during bin
Laden’s voluntary exile there.
THE TIMES AND THE MAN
I began this study with a question that perennially vexes historians: do individuals
make history, or do circumstances call forth individuals? In the
case of Osama bin Laden, the second answer seems more accurate. Events
shaped him more than he shaped them, and, had he not stepped up to become
the face of al-Qaeda, someone else almost certainly would have. He
may have had some ability to get diverse groups and individuals to work
together, but he was probably not responsible for organizing the group
and showed little interest in its day-to-day functions. Al-Qaeda’s most successful
attacks were conceived and planned by others, although he probably
had to approve them. Bin Laden was also not an original thinker. His
pronouncements, which he may not have written himself, contain a generic
list of radical Islamist grievances and platitudes. The evolution of
his thought can be traced by recounting the list of radicals with whom he
came in contact. Even his alleged charisma is suspect. Prior to his emergence
on the world stage, no one seems to have described bin Laden as charismatic.
After he achieved notoriety, few people got close enough to him
to fi nd out. Those who did were either already committed to jihad or journalists
invited in for carefully staged and closely scripted interviews.
In her thought-provoking study A Hundred Osamas, Sherifa Zuhur
makes a compelling case that the Islamist talent pool is so deep that the
movement will have no trouble replacing any number of leaders killed or
captured by the United States. She cites the case of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
as an example. In September 2003, Zarqawi created the Organization for
Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers, generally dubbed “Al-Qaeda in Iraq.”
His organization wreaked havoc in Iraq for three years before the United
States killed Zarqawi by bombing his safe house. The main al-Qaeda organization
regrouping in Pakistan did not create Zarqawi’s organization.
He chose to link up with them. For a few years, he even eclipsed Osama
CONCLUSION 115
bin Laden in the media. Once again, the event (in this case the U.S. invasion
of Iraq) called forth the man. Perhaps only timing and circumstances
kept Zarqawi from the lead role bin Laden got to play. 1
Had Osama bin Laden been born in economically disadvantaged circumstances
and yet developed the same convictions, he would probably
still have been recruited to the jihadist cause but perhaps in a very different
capacity. In many respects, he fi ts the profi le of the ideal suicide
bomber. He was a deeply impressionable young man, unswervingly loyal
to his convictions and to those who shared them. Possessed of an unshakable
faith and unfl inching courage, he genuinely believes that he acts on
God’s behalf and will be rewarded for his service to the cause, convictions
he shares with everyone who ever blew himself up in the name of God.
In the fi nal analysis, bin Laden’s most important contribution to al-
Qaeda, besides the considerable resources he commanded, may be his role
as mythic hero. From streets to palaces, he has become the symbol and
the embodiment of opposition for all those who see Islam under siege or
whose aspirations for a better life are blocked by circumstances beyond
their control. His willingness to forgo a life of luxury for one of hardship
earns him the respect of many whose suffering and want are hardly matters
of choice. Countering the threat posed by such a leader lies not in killing
or capturing him but in removing the circumstances that called him
forth in the fi rst place and that continue to make him popular.
NOTE
1 . Sherifa Zuhur, A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of
Counterinsurgency (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).
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APPENDIX: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS
The documents in this section represent a small percentage of the sources
used to produce this book. To facilitate understanding, a brief commentary
precedes each source. The sources are arranged chronologically, illustrating
how the United States’ understanding of al-Qaeda and the
threat it poses has evolved over time.
Document 1
The 1997 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report makes scant mention of Osama
bin Laden but does acknowledge his influence on and contribution to terrorist
activities around the world. The report does not seem to consider him a
serious threat to the United States. The report is available at http://www.
hri.org/docs/USSD-Terror/97/asia.html.
AFGHANISTAN
Islamic extremists from around the world — including large numbers of
Egyptians, Algerians, Palestinians, and Saudis — continued to use Afghanistan
as a training ground and home base from which to operate in
118 APPENDIX
1997. The Taliban, as well as many of the other combatants in the Afghan
civil war, facilitated the operation of training and indoctrination
facilities for non-Afghans in the territories they controlled. Several Afghani
factions also provided logistic support, free passage, and sometimes
passports to the members of various terrorist organizations. These individuals,
in turn, were involved in fi ghting in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, the Philippines, and parts of the Middle
East.
Saudi-born terrorist fi nancier Usama Bin Ladin relocated from Jalalabad
to the Taliban’s capital of Qandahar in early 1997 and established
a new base of operations. He continued to incite violence against the
United States, particularly against US forces in Saudi Arabia. Bin Ladin
called on Muslims to retaliate against the US prosecutor in the Mir Aimal
Kansi trial for disparaging comments he made about Pakistanis and
praised the Pakistan-based Kashmiri group HUA in the wake of its formal
designation as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States.
According to the Pakistani press, following Kansi’s rendition to the
United States, Bin Ladin warned the United States that, if it attempted
his capture, he would “teach them a lesson similar to the lesson they were
taught in Somalia.”
Document 2
The East Africa embassy bombings brought Osama bin Laden to the attention
of the American public. Although al-Qaeda had been in existence for
almost a decade, bin Laden was added to the U.S. terrorism list only after
the August 1998 attacks in Nairobi and Darussalam. The text of this State
Department report is available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/ terror
ism/1998Report/intro.html#foot1.
Following the bombings of the two US Embassies in East Africa, the US
Government obtained evidence implicating Usama Bin Ladin’s network
in the attacks. To preempt additional attacks, the United States
launched military strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan
on 20 August. That same day, President Clinton amended Executive
Order 12947 to add Usama Bin Ladin and his key associates to the list
of terrorists, thus blocking their US assets — including property and bank
APPENDIX 119
accounts — and prohibiting all US fi nancial transactions with them. As
a result of what Attorney General Janet Reno called the most extensive
overseas criminal investigation in US history, and working closely with
the Kenyan and Tanzanian Governments, the US Government indicted
Bin Ladin and 11 of his associates for the two bombings and other terrorist
crimes. Several suspects were brought to the United States to stand
trial. The Department of State announced a reward of up to $5 million
for information leading to the arrest or conviction of any of the suspects
anywhere in the world.
Document 3
Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa is a declaration of war against the United
States and its allies. It represents the culmination of his political/religious
worldview. The document is available at http:// www.fas.org/ irp/ world/para/
docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders
World Islamic Front Statement
23 February 1998
Shaykh Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin
Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt
Abu-Yasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group
Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan
Fazlur Rahman, amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh
Praise be to Allah, who revealed the Book, controls the clouds, defeats
factionalism, and says in His Book: “ But when the forbidden months are
past, then fi ght and slay the pagans wherever ye fi nd them, seize them,
beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)”;
and peace be upon our Prophet, Muhammad Bin-’Abdallah, who said:
I have been sent with the sword between my hands to ensure that no one
but Allah is worshipped, Allah who put my livelihood under the shadow
of my spear and who infl icts humiliation and scorn on those who disobey
my orders.
The Arabian Peninsula has never — since Allah made it fl at, created
its desert, and encircled it with seas — been stormed by any forces like
120 APPENDIX
the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping
out its plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations
are attacking Muslims like people fi ghting over a plate of food. In the
light of the grave situation and the lack of support, we and you are obliged
to discuss current events, and we should all agree on how to settle the
matter.
No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone;
we will list them, in order to remind everyone:
First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the
lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering
its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing
its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead
through which to fi ght the neighboring Muslim peoples.
If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation,
all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The
best proof of this is the Americans’ continuing aggression against the
Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its
rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are
helpless.
Second, despite the great devastation infl icted on the Iraqi people
by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those
killed, which has exceeded 1 million . . . despite all this, the Americans
are once again trying to repeat the horrifi c massacres, as though they are
not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious
war or the fragmentation and devastation.
So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate
their Muslim neighbors.
Third, if the Americans’ aims behind these wars are religious and economic,
the aim is also to serve the Jews’ petty state and divert attention
from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best
proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring
Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region
such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and
through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel’s survival and
the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula.
All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration
of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have
APPENDIX 121
throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual
duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed
by Imam Bin-Qadamah in “Al- Mughni,” Imam al-Kisa’i in “Al-Bada’i,”
al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the shaykh of al-Islam in his books,
where he said: “As for the fi ghting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at
defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [ by the ulema].
Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is
attacking religion and life.”
On that basis, and in compliance with Allah’s order, we issue the following
fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their
allies — civilians and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim
who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to
liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [ Mecca] from their
grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam,
defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with
the words of Almighty Allah, “and fi ght the pagans all together as they
fi ght you all together,” and “fi ght them until there is no more tumult or
oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.”
This is in addition to the words of Almighty Allah: “And why should
ye not fi ght in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are
ill-treated (and oppressed)? — women and children, whose cry is: ‘Our
Lord, rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise
for us from the one who will help!’ ”
We — with Allah’s help — call on every Muslim who believes in
Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah’s order to kill the
Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they fi nd
it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch
the raid on Satan’s U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with
them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn
a lesson.
Almighty Allah said: “O ye who believe, give your response to Allah
and His Apostle, when He calleth you to that which will give you life.
And know that Allah cometh between a man and his heart, and that it
is He to whom ye shall all be gathered.”
Almighty Allah also says: “O ye who believe, what is the matter with
you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, ye cling so
heavily to the earth! Do ye prefer the life of this world to the hereafter?
122 APPENDIX
But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the hereafter. Unless
ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others
in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For Allah
hath power over all things.”
Almighty Allah also says: “So lose no heart, nor fall into despair. For
ye must gain mastery if ye are true in faith.”
Document 4
A grand jury indicted bin Laden and his associates for the East Africa bombings.
Following is the introduction to the indictment and its first count. The
entire document is available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.find law.com/
hdocs/docs/ binladen/usbinladen1.pdf.
The Grand Jury charges:
Background: Al Qaeda
1. At all relevant times from in or about 1989 until the date of
the fi ling of this Indictment, an international terrorist group
existed which was dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments
with force and violence. This organization grew out of
the “mekhtab al khidemat” (the “Services Offi ce”) organization
which had maintained offi ces in various parts of the world, including
Afghanistan, Pakistan ( particularly in Peshawar) and
the United States, particularly at the Alkifah Refugee Center
in Brooklyn, New York. The group was founded by defendants
USAMA BIN LADEN and MUHAMMAD ATEF, a/ k/a “Abu
Hafs al Masry,” together with “Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri” and others.
From in or about 1989 until the present, the group called
itself “al Qaeda” (“the Base”). From 1989 until in or about 1991,
the group (hereafter referred to as “al Qaeda”) was headquartered
in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. In or about 1991,
the leadership of al Qaeda, including its “emir ” (or prince) defendant
USAMA BIN LADEN, relocated to the Sudan. Al
Qaeda was headquartered in the Sudan from approximately
1991 until approximately 1996 but still maintained offi ces in
APPENDIX 123
various parts of the world. In 1996, defendants USAMA BIN
LADEN and MUHAMMAD ATEF and other members of al
Qaeda relocated to Afghanistan. At all relevant times, al Qaeda
was led by its emir, defendant USAMA BIN LADEN. Members
of al Qaeda pledged an oath of allegiance (called a “ bayat”)
to defendant USAMA BIN LADEN and al Qaeda. Those who
were suspected of collaborating against al Qaeda were to be
identifi ed and killed.
2. Al Qaeda opposed the United States for several reasons. First,
the United States was regarded as an “infi del” because it was not
governed in a manner consistent with the group’s extremist interpretation
of Islam. Second, the United States was viewed as
providing essential support for other “infi del” governments and
institutions, particularly the governments of Saudi Arabia and
Egypt, the nation of Israel and the United Nations organization,
which were regarded as enemies of the group. Third, al Qaeda
opposed the involvement of the United States armed forces in
the Gulf War in 1991 and in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
in 1992 and 1993, which were viewed by al Qaeda as pretextual
preparations for an American occupation of Islamic countries. In
particular, al Qaeda opposed the continued presence of American
military forces in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi
Arabian peninsula) following the Gulf War. Fourth, al Qaeda
opposed the United States Government because of the arrest,
conviction and imprisonment of persons belonging to al Qaeda
or its affi liated terrorist groups or with whom it worked, including
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.
3. One of the principal goals of al Qaeda was to drive the United
States armed forces out of Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the
Saudi Arabian peninsula) and Somalia by violence. Members
of al Qaeda issued fatwahs (rulings on Islamic law) indicating
that such attacks were both proper and necessary.
4. From in or about 1993, until in or about December 1999,
AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI, a/ k/a “Abdel Muaz,” a / k/a “ Dr. Ayman
al Zawahiri,” a/ k/a “the Doctor,” a/ k/a “ Nur,” a/ k/a “ Ustaz,” a/ k/a
“Abu Mohammed,” a / k/a “Abu Mohammed Nur al-Deen,” led
124 APPENDIX
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad which was dedicated to the forceful
overthrow of the Egyptian Government and to violent opposition
of the United States, in part, for its support of the Government
in Egypt. Members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad also pledged
allegiance to AL ZAWAHIRI and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Many
of the leading members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad became
infl uential members of al Qaeda, including defendants AYMAN
AL ZAWAHIRI and MUHAMMAD ATEF. Eventually, by at
least in or about February 1998, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad led
by AL ZAWAHIRI had effectively merged with al Qaeda and
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad joined with al Qaeda in targeting
American civilians.
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